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JUSTICE JOHNSON
MR. JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON, JURIST IN LIMINE:
Vrnws ON JUDICIAL PRECEDENT*

A. J. Levint

I
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS OF JUDGING
A. Superstitious Level of Man's Mental Progress

W

E HAVE already become familiar with Johnson's awareness
of the unconsciousness of mankind "of the shackles which
superstition and tyranny had thrown around" it. He was also sensitive
to the part which the law had played in preserving such a state of
affairs. His keen and analytic mind was unwilling to accept as final
what he knew was the illusive mirage of reality. The situation was
a frustrating one-so much so that few minds today are prepared to
accept the challenge which such a dynamic attitude entailed for him.
He began anticipating beyond the capacities of the minds of those
around him. It increased his anguish that he was so quick to detect
the aggressions of those in whose society he lived who were alert to
attach to a scintilla of rationality the full force of their displaced hatred
and prejudice. Few could understand him. Surely, Jefferson could
but there was only one Jefferson. Johnson was intellectually and
emotionally almost alone.
Johnson considered it the aim of civilization to attain what he
called rational liberty 131 as a substitute for the mental anarchy
which was prevalent. What situation did he find when he began to
work toward that end? The American Revolution had released some
critical forces but when it was over the principal explanation of almost
everything was, as it had been before, tradition. Most conduct had
no better basis than the fact that it had been compulsively inculcated
by one's parents and that it bore the stamp of some outside authority.
A major source of jurisprudence, then, was the mandate, "honor thy

*
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This is the second of three articles on Mr. Justice Johnson to be published in
this volume of the REVIEW.
Member of the (Detroit) Michigan Bar. A.B., J.D., University of Michigan;
author, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma," 42 M1cH. L.
REV. 803 (1944); "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 M1cH.
L. REV. 497 (1944); "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of
Life," 44 M1cH. L. REV. 59, 243 (1945); and other articles in this and other legal
periodicals.-Ed.
181
Dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 at
74, 25 S.Ct. 539 (1905).
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father and thy mother." Dissent of any kind, therefore, had the quality
of family disobedieµce. The chain action which made of superstition
an instrument of continuity with the archaic past was almost unbreakable, since the child was emotionally unprepared to break chain which
tied him to civilized society. Thus were children brought up without
the capacity for choice. Democracy was confined to political choiceand that within narrow limits-but there was to be no choice of the
mind. There could be no real empathy under such conditions, only
obedience through fear and repetitive behavior. Each generation passed
on its own fears to its children with the effect that education was less a
means of preparing the child for life than the best available means
of maintaining'traditional controls for the parents' sake. Law, which
became the prevailing institution, was only a passable and tolerated
means of somehow or other preserving order. It had little-if anything-to do with the affective bases of human relationships; and
when law-in-action did play a part it was all too often to satisfy the
individual's need to discharge his affect upon an object rather than to
promote justice in its deeper connotations. There was an all-embracing atmosphere of mental enslavement and, therefore, continually
smouldering resentment, which was eventually to break through in
the form of open rebellion against actual human slavery. In a word,
we find a clear psychodynamic relationship between the state· of mind
of the contemporary society and the emergence of the "slavery question."
Johnson began his attack on the enslaved mind by adopting the
method of strict scrutiny of its manifestations. Principle and precedent,
useful as they could be when choice and evaluation were possible,.had
been the tools of mental degradation when misapplied. We have seen
that at an early stage he was tempted by natural law doctrine which
he eventually discarded; but he did not offer as a substitute "an intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise" 182 which, though
it furnishes opportunities for the same kind of biased judging, has of
late been glorified into a judicial method.188

a

~
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Oration delivered at St. Phillips Church, Charleston, p. 22 (1813).
J. W. JoNEs, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LAW 194
(1940), under the heading "Intuition in the judicial process" says: "No one can doubt
that a soundly based science of psychology would be of immense value to legislators,
judges, and officials by helping them gauge the effects of their enactments or decisions
upon the individual and upon society at large, and to fix and measure liability in particular cases. So far, little more has been done than to emphasize the part played by
intuition in judicial process." See also p. 124 where the author shows 'how natural
law may be used as a cloak for personal views. See Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MICH. L. REV. ·497 at 515, note 47 (1944).
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B. "Angry, Vindictive Judging'' as a Consequence of the Enslaved
Condition of Man's Mind
The psychological process of judging is assumes! by some ·to be
presently fully understood, but there is much yet to be learned. Chancellor Kent has left his mark on American jurisprudence. Shirley recalled, however, that "the shrewd old chancellor" could boast of the
immense advantage he had over his brethren because they did not
understand French or civil law. "I could generally put my brethren
to rout and carry my point," he boasted, "by my mysterious wand of
French and civil law. The judges were republicans, and very kindly
disposed to every thing that was French, and thus enabled me, without
exciting any alarm or jealousy, to make free use of such authorities,
and thereby·enrich our 'commercial law.' I gradually acquired proper
directing influence with my brethren, and the volumes in Johnson [ the
New Yark reporter], after I became judge in I 804, show it." 1 34,
If we understand law as a communicative means, whereby the
understanding gained by the individuals in society are reciprocally communicated to its various members and perceived and experienced by
each we may study law and the judicial function and the judicial process
more scientifically. And, what is more, since judging is a universal
function indulged in by all of mankind, by the layman, the legislator, the executive, the priest, the lawyer and the psychologist as well
as the professional judge, conclusions con,cerning the judicial process
may shed light on all other judging processes and vice versa.
·
"Angry, vindictive passions of men," observed Johnson, "have
too often made their way into judicial tribunals." 135 While human
aggression is a fact-as much so as the weather-its discovery in places
formerly considered free from its destructive influences should help
society proceed toward a greater measure of self-control based upon
understanding rather than prohibition. Cultural sublimation is not
enough. With it must needs go increased awareness of one's own
psychodynamic processes and those of others. Without such knowledge
and both' the conscious and unconscious self-control that goes with it
there can be no real psychic basis of guilt. Indeed, our criminal juris184
SHIRLEY, THE DARTMOUTH CoLLEGE CAUSES 257 (1879); also "Heiskell's
Reports, Volumes 1 and z," l SouTHERN L. REv. 446 (1872).
185
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, l Wheat, (14 U.S.) 304 at 377 (1816). In a
letter to Thomas Jefferson, dated April II, 1823, Joh11son spoke of the predominance
of "little passions" in men of prominence. Johnson was especially quick to oppose "unfounded doctrines" which afforded facilities "for giving undue bias to public opinion, .
and ••• of interpolating doctrines which belong not to the law." Ramsay v. Allegre,
12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 6n at 614 (1827).
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, prudence is based upon an assumption of cause which has but little to
support it; for, it is seldom· that the individual has the personality
training and knowledge to overcome his misdirected childhood. Yet
the resistance to understanding one's self is tremendous. The most
courageous and aggressive conduct upon the part of dissenting individuals has thoroughout the course of history been required to make
even slight progress. With this background of the history of the mind
of man, we may the better appraise Johnson's efforts and, indeed, his
occasional turbulence.
·

II
JUDICIAL PRECEDENT

A. Abuses of Reporters
Lord Campbell said of his own work as a reporter: "When I was
a Nisi Prius reporter, I had a drawer marked <Bad Law' into which
I threw all cases which seemed improperly ruled." 186 This bold selection: of precedent by a reporter would be accepted by most lawyers
with a smile; but let a judge discard a case as bad law and the cry
is raised that he is undermining the stability of our institutions and rendering law so uncertain as to make it impossible for a lawyer to render
an opinion to a client. No doubt Johnson had become quite familiar
with the kind of reporting which reflected the ideas of the reporter
as to what the law should be, and also with the type of precedentmaking indulged in by Chancellor Kent. He consequently considered
it a serious misdeed for a reporter to misreport a case. It amounted to
the substitution of fantasy for fact since the false precedent could be
nothing less than a «phantom." Since the extension of authority beyond its legitimate scope had always successfully used this means
Johnson was on the lookout to see that the new democracy was not
so deceived.
B. A Psychodynamic View of Dictum
With Johnson the reluctance to indulge in dictum or to rely upon
it was a personality trait. Every judge writes dictum at some time
or other and every judge to some degree relies upon the dictum written
by others in the same sense that he is permitted to draw upon all
sources of human knowledge and experience for his judgments.
Meticulous analogous conj'µnction of fact and law is well nigh impossible and sl;ch requirement would soon become a tool of the compulsive
186

4 Camp. Chane., 45 8 quoted in CRoA~E
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86 (1899).
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literalist. But the allurement of the exercise of authority is very great.
The practice of writing dictum like incorrect reporting is common.
When it becomes judicial habit it implies the ability of each judge
to substitute a textbook of his own authorship for the applicable legal
principle; fact and law, thus, become unrealistically separated.
In the hands of a dominant personality, precedent counts for very
little when important issues are at stake. This was undoubtedly true
of Chief Justice Marshall who repeatedly disregarded precedent but
always solemnly repeated the need to follow fundamental principles.
The decision in the case of Marbury v. Madison 187 has been considered
by many as judicial supererogation for the reason that it was dictum
on the important and far-reaching assertion of the right to declare
acts of Congress unconstitutional. We are not concerned at this point
with the merits of the general question of judicial review on constitutional grounds. The fact that the charge that the decision was unnecessary and the question not justiciable is made suggests the possibilities for the exercise of power by a judicial body when no appealexcept to lethargic and fearful public opinion-from such a decision is
possible. Johnson came to the Supreme Court a year after Marshall
had rendered this decision.188
Johnson insisted that the judicial function in any case required
close adherence to the facts underlying the precedent to be applied.
"The rule of law," said he in Love v. Simm's Lessee, "that a plaintiff
must recover on the strength of his own title, and not the weakness
• of his adversary's, must be limited and explained by the nature of each
case as it arises." 189 This seems quite a simple statement made in passing
but a closer examination will reveal that it is the very essence of a
dynamic jurisprudence, for here we find the doctrine--so obnoxious
to the textbook mind-that the principle itself is altered by the application of it. This is an expansive doctrine and, possibly, too modern for
some moderns. That Johnson knew what he was doing in announcing
such a view appears in Patapsco Insurqnce Company v. Coulter-"restricted doctrines will also be found correct, which in a more general
sense, might well be questioned." 140 He was too well equipped for
187
I Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803); also Bank of the United States v. Owens, 2
Pet. (27 U.S.) 527 (1803).
188
For a discussion of Johnson's views on the subject of judicial review, see Levin,
"Mr. Justice William Johnson and The Unenviable Dilemma," 42 M1cH. L. REv.
803 at 804 et seq. (1944).
189
9 Wheat. (11 U.S.) 515 at 524 (1824). (Italics the writer's.)
140
3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 222 at 235 (1830). The full passage reads: "The case of
Green vs. The Phoenix Insurance Company, decided in New York, was certainly a

'MrcHIGAN LAW

R~vrnw

the adversaries of his day with that unusual insight which enabled him
to see in these trends the all too common legalistic distortions, evasions
and other devices of rationalization. Dictum was to be treated with
suspicion-not merely disregarded. A display of erudition seemed to
him to becloud the issues with a smoke screen of protective intellectualization.
While it was acknowl~dged that Johnson usually avoided dictum,
he was nevertheless severely criticized for indulging in the writing
of views not necessary for the decision of the case in the opinion in
Elkison v. Deliesseline.141 Caroliniensis characterized portions of the
opinion as "extra judicial": 142
"But now I put it to my fellow-citizens, and to the world,
to tell me, in what portion of the habitable globe, in which civilization and refinement reign, or civil liberty rears her head, it was
ever required of a judge, as a part of his duty, to seize hold of a
sentiment expressed by Counsel, irrelevant to the point, finally
decided, and not censured at the moment, and to make it the subject of a judicial remark, in a written opinion. I protest, my countrymen, against this, as contrary to all rule and propriety; as un. precedented in practice, as it is unfair in principle: as cruel as it
is ungenerous." 143
•
The same critic called it a "volunteer opinion" 144 which, he asserts,
was disapproved by everyone in court; and he quoted froin that portion
of Johnson's language in his opinion in the Amanda-of which the following is a more complete excerpt-in which Johnson disparaged the
authority of nisi prius decisions:
very strong case to establish the doctrine that a loss by fire, proceeding from negligence
of the masi:er and mariners, w~s not a loss within the policy, although barratry be one
of the. risks. It will, however, be found, by looking into the reasons which governed
the Court in that case, that its conclusions were drawn partly from the too general
expressions of an elementary writer, and partly from analogy with other decisions in
which the expressions of the court, unless restricted to the cases before them, were
justly deemed authority for the decision there rendered. The question was ·one of the
first impressions, and one on which the best-constituted minds may well have been led
to contrary conclusions. It was, however, no unreasonable claim upon the profession
made by Lawrence, Justice, in the case of Phyn vs. The Royal Ex. Ass. Company,
with regard to his qwn doctrines in Moss v. Byron, 'that what fell from him there
must be taken in reference to the case then in judgment before the Court.' Thus, restricted doctrines will often be found correct, which in a more general sense might well
be questioned." Id. at 234, 235.
·
141
46 M1cH. L. REv. 131 at 14.8, et seq. (1947).
142
CAROLINIENSIS 14 ( Charleston, l 82 3).
143 Id. p. I 9.
144 Id. p. 20.
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'Hn the very able argument in this case, the decision in the
case of DeLovio and Boit reported in 2 Gallison has been much
commented upon; and was in fact the authority upon which the
Libel was preferred; and I feel embarrassed now to dispose of
this part of the argument lest I should be charged on the one
hand, with disrespect of the opinion of one of my learned brethren,
and on the other exhibit the indecent spectacle of maintaining with
him a controversy before the public. Thus balanced I have resolved not to review that decision, because as I have observed
in another case, in common with my own decisions, those of my
brethren on circuit are not authority; and I shall never feel myself at liberty to canvass them anywhere but in my study or in
the Supreme Court. I have still another reason: those who have
observed my judicial habits will have noticed that I seldom, if
ever, rest my opinions upon nisi prius decisions. I think it a public
misfortune that they are ever published: for they commit a judge
to posterity without an opportunity of correcting his errors; add
to the already enormous bulk and expense of a Law Library;
often make business for our Courts which never would have
originated otherwise; and finally give a bias to legal opinions
which ought to be received exclusively from tribunals of the last
resort. . . .
,
There are other questions of great commercial importance in
this case, but I shall adhere to my constant practice of never seeking for more than dne sufficient ground to decree upon." 145

C. Application of Abstract Principles to Specific Circumstances
"Refining too much" 146 upon legal principle led to much difficulty
in litigation. The English law was anchored to the idea of precedent
145

The decision in DeLovio and Boit was by Justice Story on circuit. The unpublished opinion of the Amanda tried on Circuit by Justice Johnson is set out in
full in the City Gazette of Charleston, S.C., of January 18, 1822. See CAROLINIENSIS
30 (Charleston, 1823), for the reference to the Amanda. See also pp. 29 and 48.
"Under these few words 'shall regulate commerce,' a State right of greater magnitude,
than any she has ever claimed, or exercised, is to be swallowed up in that tremendous gulf, the implied powers of Congress. So, says Judge Johnson, in an extra
judicial opinion, published to the world; published too, against a determination which
he previously promulgated in a previous decision, that he never wished to see a nisi
prius opinion of his in print. The amiable and distinguished Judge Story's nisi pritn
reports ought not, in the mind of our judge, go down to posterity, until they are revised and con.firmed by some tribunal of dernier resort. But everything that comes
from his extra judicial pen, no matter how hurtful to the public weal, is to be submitted to without further review."
146
"The difficulties in this case appear to me to arise from refining too much
upon the legal principles relative to ecclesiastical property under the laws of England.
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as reported 147 by the opinions of judges and the reporters. The written
word has often invited the mind of man to challenge it. When it has
been approved it has been cherished as wise precedent; but when it
has obstructed the wishes of the one who is hindered by the record
of the past the adherence to the written word has been stigmatized as
literal or pharisaic. Neither view is objectively scientific. In McClung
v. Silliman 148 we find Johnson observing that the case presented "no
ordinary group of legal questions. They exhibit a striking specimen
of the involutions which ingenuity may cast about legal rights. . . .
The case certainly does present one •of those instances of equivocal
language, in which the proposition, though true in the abstract, is, in
its application to the subject glaringly incorrect.149 • • • It is not the
first time that this court has encountered similar difficulties, in its advance to .questions brought up from other tribunals. It has avoided
them, by deciding that it is not bound to encounter phantoms." 160
It was common for Johnson to agree with counsel that the court
in a cited case had appeared to go to the length contended for but he
would add that these expressions relied upon had to be considered as
"mere obiter opinions, since the decision of the cause did not depend
upon them." 161 Nor was this a judicial pose, for we find him applying
I find no difficulty in getting a sufficient trustee to sustain the fee, until the uses
shall arise." Town of Pawlet v. Daniel Clark, 9 Cranch (13 U.S.) 292 at 337 (1815).
147
Edmund Burke once wrote: "To give judgment privately is to put an end
to reports; and to put an end to reports is to put an end to the law of England! •••"
Quoted by John H. Wigmore in "The Cumulative Burden of Reports," 25 J. AM.
Jun. 148
Soc. 174 (1942).
6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 598 (1821).
149
Id. at 598, 601. (Italics the writer's.)
160 Id. at 603. (Italics the writer's.) See also last sentence of Johnson's note on
Calder v. Bull appended to the case of Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. (27 U.S.)
380 at 416 et seq. (1829).
161
Dawson's Lessee v. Godfrey, 4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 321 at 323 (1808); also_
Marine Insurance Co. v. Tucker, 3 Cranch (7 U.S.) 357 at 385 (1806), where he
rejected a doctrine "probably suggested by some incorrect expressions attributed to Lord
Mansfield" in a certain opinion that "was certainly in no wise material to the decision
of that case •.•"; and also Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. (16 U.S.) 246 at 333 (1818),
where he concurred with the majority but said that the opinion delivered goes into
"consideration, of a variety of topics which do not appear to me to be essential to the
case.•.•"
In The Atlanta, 3 Wheat. (16 U.S.) 409 at 419,420 (1818) he said: "It has long
been with me a rule of judicial proceeding, never, where I am free to act, to decide
more in any case than what the case itself necessarily requires; and so far only in my
view can a case be considered as authority•••• I have no objection to reserving the
question on such a case, until it shall occur." For example, also, his method of analysis
in Barry v. Coombe, 1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 640 at 651 (1828): "On this part of the
cause, the case of Stokes fl. Moore has been cited (1 Cox 218), and insisted on, as
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the same test of "judicious" conduct to the activities of General Greene.
In his Life of Greene he said of Greene: "His letters addressed to
the executive of the states respectively, exhibit something more than
strong good sense; they are marked by a judicious application of his
topic to the peculiar circumstances of each state." 152

D. Dynamic Function of Precedent Compared with Function in
Physical Sciences
His ability to detect departures from the setting in which the
precedent arose was little short of the uncanny. But uncanniness often
means only that the general level of knowledge ·has not yet attained
such facility at understanding. In a number of instances his condemnation of the efforts of counsel, the courts, the writers and reporters for
extending actual adjudication beyond the facts which gave rise to a
particular decision rested in a strong feeling as to the nature of the
judicial function. If his emotions became strongly aroused, as they
did at times, it was because he saw more clearly than others; because
he understood the tendency of the human mind to stretch precedents,
whether legal or otherwise, beyond their actual and functional environment-the all too prevalent inclination to mistake one's own statement of reason as a common denominator of the wishes and needs of
society. He, nevertheless, employed precedent to prove his point, as
in his note on ex post facto legislation:

''It is laid down, indeed, as a principle of the Roman civil law,
'that in cases which depend upon fundamental principles, from
which demonstrations may be drawn, millions of precedents are
of no 'Value.' Ayliffe, 5. And the English law concurs with the
Roman in this, 'that an extrajudicial opinion, given in or out of
court, is no good precedent; for it is no more than the prolatum,
or saying, of him who gives it.' An opinion given in court, if not
necessary to the judgment given of record, is, according to
Vaughan, no judicial opinion at all, and consequently, no precefurnishing an argument against the sufficiency of the signature of Barry in this cause.
But in the case of Stokes o. Moore, it must be observed that both the judges who sat
in that cause admit, that this was not the principal quesion in the cause, and it was
decided upon the ground, that the memorandum was proved not to express the entire
agreement between the parties. But if considered as authority in this point, it is only
necessary to advert to the ground upon which the opinion is expressed, 'that the name
there WllS not a sufficient signature, under the statute,' in order to discover, that it
does not impugn the opinion entertained by this court in the present cause."
152

I WILLIAM JOHNSON, SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF

NATHANIEL GREEN

329 (1822). (Italics the writer's.)
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dent; for the same judgment might as well have been given, if
no such, or a contrary, opinion, had been brought; nor is such
an opinion any more than a gratis dictum.' Ayliffe, 9." m
These views as to the function of precedent and the place of the
ju~iciary in giving them effect were sincerely applied in his own case.
He followed a rule of withholding his own opinion "upon successive
cases as they shall occur" 154 and made it quite clear that he preferred
to found his opinion upon his own "researches and resources." 155 On
constitutional questions he always delivered a separate or dissenting
opinion. 158
..
A court decision is an interpretive responsy to the request for the
solution of an ambiguity in the experience of individuals or groups.
At a later date the communication will no longer be responsive since
the intepretive circumstances calling for the communication no longer
exist. It is only when present judgment, seeking to_ solve a new
ambiguity, needs the advice of the previous judging experience that
the past has anything to offer to, the present by way of a short cut.
Limiting precedent to the ratio decidendi is no less 1mportant in achieving correct analogy in the law than in the physical sciences. The physical scientists also arrive at a .judgment based upon a set of facts. The
subsequent scientist wants to know what the judgment ·was upon these
facts. He then may either challenge the judgment or employ it as advice applicable to the current problem. Past experience is invoked in aid
of a present result in all cases, without exception. This holds true even
in the case of the most compelling mandates when the compulsion is
but one form of persuasion. It would appear, then, that the judge who
153

The note to Satterlee v. Matthewson will be found in 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 380 at
415; the quoted portion is on p. 416a (italics the writer's). See also p. 416b, where
Johnson said: "The learned judges, in the case of Calder v. Bull, rely on Blackstone
and Wooddeson for a contrary doctrine; but on examining these writers, the latter will
be found to be anything but an authority to their purpose; and that in the former there
is nothing furnished that can be held conclusive on the subject.
"High and respectable as is the authority of these distinguished men, it is not
unpermitted to say that when they speak of the known and settled and technical meaning of words, they submit their opinions to that arbiter of truth to whose jurisdiction all
men have an equal right to appeal. I think I have gone far to show that their quotations
do not fix the meaning of the phrase under consideration with immovable firmness .
• . • Certainly, in Lord Raymond's time it had not received this technical established
signification, and how it can be proved to have acquired it since, is not very easy to
perceive."
154
Hodgson v. Marine Insurance Co., 5 Cranch (9 U.S.) 100 at II4 (1.809).
155
The Atlanta, 3 Wheat. (16 U.S.) 409 at 432 (1818).
156
See Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MICH. L •
. REv. 497 at 512 et seq. (1944).
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wishes to state things in his own way in order not to mislead others
with inapplicable advice will not be so easily misled himself. "I approach the case," said Johnson, in the· celebrated case of The N ereide,
"with all the hesitation which respect for the opinion of others, and a
conviction of the novelty and importance of som~ of the questions are
calculated to inspire. The same respect imposes upon me an obligation
briefly to state the course of reasoning by which I am led to my conclusion." 161
These are the words of one who is aware of the omnipresent factors
of conflict in social relationships but, more important, of one who feels
strongly the responsibility for approaching such problems without the
bias of authority. Authority is to be respected for its worth but the
obligation to weigh and analyze a novel situation was not to be resolved
by the mere reference to the opinion of others whether expr~ssed in a
case or elsewhere. Whereas other judges spoke of the "delicacy" of
a situation but acted as if no such delicacy existed, with Johnson such
an utterance meant a serious amount of self-scrutiny-as the situation
implied.
E. Function of Generalities
We have already seen that Johnson admonished that the rule of
law "must be limited and explained by the nature of each case as it
arises." But' it must not be concJuded that this meant that general rules
had no value whatever. In Rose v. Himely he went as far as to say
that, where the jurisdiction of a foreign court was concerned, "not
being at liberty ... to lift the mantle of justice cast upon their decrees,
it is as to other tribunals of justice, immaterial what errors it covers;
neither the fallibility of the judge, the perjury of witnesses, nor the
oppression and injustice of nations, will sanction a deviation from this
general rule." 168 He also on a number of occasions adverted to the
existence of "universal rules." Although it is not made clear what
he meant by such rules it may be inferred that he did not mean to
convey a rigid conception of unalterable finality. 169 More often he
161

9 Cranch (13 U.S.) 388 at 431 (1815).
4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 509 at 512 (1808).
u 9 For an earlier discussion of Johnson's idea of universal law or natural law as
interpreted by the writer, see Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common
Incidents of Life: II," 44 MrcH. L. REv. 243 at 269 (1945).
In Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (10 U.S.) 87 at 143 (1810), he had said that a
state could not revoke its credits "on a general principle, on the reason and nature of
things; a principle which will impose laws even on the Deity"; and also that the
"security of a people against the misconduct of their rulers, must lie in the frequent
recurrence to first principles, and the imposition of adequate constitutional· restrictions."
168
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warned against generality. Almost one hundred years before Justice
Holmes, Johnson had already put into practice Holmes' warnings.
"Dangerous as it always is, in a court of justice, to generalize in the
propo~itions which it decides," he asserted in one of his early cases
dealing with a question of insurance, "it is peculiarly so in questions
arising on policies of insurance"; and then he added: "The present
proposition is obviously couched in terms too general to admit of an
answer in the affirmative, without restriction or modification." 160
In his dissent in Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch (II U.S.) 481 (1813) he declared that
"there are certain eternal principles of justice, which never ought to be dispensed
with, and which courts of justice can never dispense with, but when compelled by
positive statute." On a number of occasions Johnson quoted legal maxims, particularly
from the Latin, as in Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 457 at 466
( I 8 3 1) : "Interest republicae ut finis sit litium and oigilantibus non dormientibus
succurit lex, are not among the least favored by the maxims of the law." In Marine
Insurance Co. of Alexandria v. Tucker, an early opinion, 3 Cranch (7 U.S.) 357 at
384 (1806) he said: "I will only remark, that it was judicious in the counsel, to
_!lbandon an opinion, as inconsistent, with natural reason, as it is with the established
doctrine of the law of insurance." In Doe v. Winn, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 233 at 245
( l 8 31), he stated that the general rule was infinitely more important than a rule of
evidence.
160
Buck and Hedrick v. Chesapeake Insurance Co., I Pet. (26 U.S.) 151 at 159
(1828) (italics the writer's). See also Campbell v. Pratt, 5 Wheat. (18 U.S.) 428
at 431 (1820), where he concluded that "this exposition of the decree is perfectly
consonant with general principles" but only after he had asserted that if the distribution in question were conformable to the decree "it is vain to refer to general principles."
. In The Atlanta, 3 Wheat. (16 U.S.) 409 at 426 (1820) he spoke of that which
"consumes the vitals" of the rule.
Commenting on the land laws of Virginia, he found that her land system was
"altogether peculiar, and presented so many aspects in which it was necessary to consider it, in order to afford protection to the interests imparted by it, that it might, with
much apparent reason, have been supposed to require something more than the general
principle, to secure those interests." Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 457
at 46 5 ( l 8 3 I). This illustrates very well . the fact that the challenge of principle may
be employed as well to protect property rights as to take exception to the fixed nature
of such rights. There is no political or moral bias in the operation of psychodynamic
processes. These characteristics may become altered in complexion by the ambivalent
use the individual makes of them. In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 at 883 (1824)
in answer to an argument made on general principles he stated that "this doctrine has
my hearty concurrence in its general application." It was common for him to agree
with principle and then proceed to distinguish the application of it. In his dissent in
Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, I Pet. (26 U.S.) 46 at 81 (1828), we find principle
clashing with principle, for he argued against extending a principle "to the violation
of its own spirit and intent, if carried to the extent of overturning known established
rules, both of law and practice."
In his dissent in Governor of Georgia v. Sundry African slaves, I Pet. (26 U.S.)
IIO at 134 (1828), Johnson reluctantly resorts to precedent: "It is almost a work of
supererogation to resort to precedents on such a question; but if necessary, there is no
want of precedents, to prove, that the district court was bound to go on, and render
justice to the libellant, according to the forms of admiralty, as far as it could proceed."
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Since abstraction is an arrangement into genera and species it is in
fact also generalization. Both abstraction and generalization were condemned because of the illusion of reality created by their misuse. In
one of his dissenting opinions Johnson found, after diligent attention
to the questions in the cause, that he could not help coming to the
conclusion "that its difficulties are rather artificial or factitious." 161
This was said after a quarter of a century on the Bench and some few
years after he had written in Ogden v. Saunders that all the "notions
of society, particularly in their jurisprudence, are more or less artificial." 162 This will account for the comment that the decisions of the
prize courts "do not derive their effect from their abstract justice." 168
It explains also why, in a dissent delivered·the next year, he announced
that legal claims must be supported by legal proof and that "abstract
rights of parties become immaterial, if not susceptible of substantiation by evidence.164 His conception of the judicial process embraced an
advanced insight into the connection between law and fact which gave
to fact the more dynamic position. And it is nothing short of extraordinary that his psychodynamic reactions not only remained the same
throughout his career but can be traced with unusual accuracy by those
who would take 1:he pains to study his life and work for what it disFinlay v. King's Lessee, 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 346 at 385 (1830).
12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 290 (1827). (Italics to writer's.)
168
Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 241 at 285 (1808).
In L'Invincible, l Wheat. (14 U.S.) 238 at 258 (1816), Johnson made the
following comment on a case offered by counsel: "That case certainly will not support
the doctrine contended for in this case. It is true that the court there lay down a
principle, which in its general application is unquestionably correct, and which, considered in the abstract, might be supposed applicable to the present case. But this
presents only one of innumerable cases which occur in our books to prove how apt we
are to misconceive and misapply the decisions of a court, by detaching those decisions
from the case which the court propose to decide."
See also his refusal to give an opinion on the abstract in Pierce v. Turner, 5
Cranch (9 U.S.) 154 at 171 (1809).
See also Dorr v. Pacific Insurance Co., 7 Wheat. (20 U.S.) 581 at 611 (1822),
where he also rejected an argument from the abstract: "It is unquestionably true, in the
abstract, that a certificate of survey is not legal evidence; because the examination of
the surveyors themselves would be better. But parties may by compact adopt that or
any other, as the criterion for deciding on their relative rights; and in the case before us, the rights of the parties are made to depend on the fact of the survey, rather
than on the truth of it. They have chosen a rule of decision for themselves, and we
are not to inquire into their motives or prudence in doing so."
lM His interest was mainly substantive evidence. He had a distaste for "formal
and ordinary recurrence to proof." Johnson's Eulogy of Jefferson in SELECTION OF
EULOGIES PRONOUNCED IN THE SEVERAL STATES IN HoNoR OF JoHN ADAMS AND
THOMAS JEFFERSON 311 (1826). This showed itself also in 'his aversion to refinements and technicalities of all kinds and also his criticism of the complexities of common
law pleading.
161
162
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closes of the processes of .individual experiences rather than merely as
accompaniments of events of history.
The modernity of J ohn~on's approach stands out when we read
in a recent opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a contempt case: "the
administration of law, particularly that of the criminal law, normally
operates in an environment that is not universal or even general but
·individual." 165 If an emphasis on the individual sources in law is
indicated by this language we may have reason to hope for a return
to the dynamic beginnings made by Johnson and progress from there
forward. But we do not have any strong basis for belief that even Mr.
Justice Frankfurter would be willing to say that the Supreme Court
as the supreme arbiter should vigorously and fearlessly apply the best
available knowledge in reaching its decisions-instead of reflecting the
reduced common denominator which blind adherence to the idea of continuity implies. There is nothing in the Constitution of the United
States which compels the Supreme Court to follow instead of to lead
in the science of und;rstanding government. The policy of restraint
because of lack of fitness does not prevent the Supreme Court from
-becoming more fit by virtue of the knowledge it applies! So long as it
has some work to do-be it much or ever so little-its members must \
perform their tasks as informed and enlightened men. The history of
courts which have merely acted as "a brake on other men's conduct"to recall Mr. Juctice Frankfurter's description of the Court's functionhas not left a record of accomplishment in the progress of the understanding of justice that deserves to survive as an immutable precedent
for the future.
Curiously enough, Mr. Justice Reed's opinion for the majority
reiterated substantially what had been once stated by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter to be the place of the law. "The law," wrote Mr. Justice
Reed, "deals in generalities and external standards and cannot depend
on varying degrees of moral courage or stability in the face of criticism
which individual judges may possess any more than it generally can
-depend on the personal equations or individual idiosyncrasies of the
tort-feasor." 166 Granted that it is not good judgment to curtail the
165
Concurring in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029 (1946).
Shortly thereafter Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463
at 478, 66 S.Ct. 1318 (1946), wrote: "For Fisher is not the name of a theoretical
problem. We are not dealing here with an abstract man who killed an abstr~ct woman
under abstract circumstances and received an abstract trial on abstract issues." See
discussion of this case infra, p. 497.
166
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 at 348, 66 S.Ct. 1029 (1946). The
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hard-won gains which are summarized in the words "freedom of the
press," nevertheless, Justice Reed's statement of the nature and func..:
tion of law is obviously fragmentary and scientifically obsolete. Nor
is it in accordance with legal history and experience, even though he
supports his view with a reference to a typical ambivalent remark of
Justice Holmes about the "personal equation." That the law does in
fact depend on varying degrees of the personal equation. in the performance of the judicial function can be demonstrated by reference to
the creation of numerous rules of trial procedure applicable to trial by
jury all aimed to protect the mind of the juryman from partiality,
prejudice and unconscious influences; by reference to the affidavit of
prejudice which challenges. the right of the court to proceed because
of bias; by the example of all the laws and statutes which bar a judge
from sitting in a cause because of interest in the outcome or the operation of unconscious motivations where there is consanguinity. And,
if we venture into fields other thaff contempt of court, we can begin
with the discretion of the chancellor in equity cases, proceed to manstatement of Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred to is from West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 655, 63 S.Ct. u78 (1943), and reads: "Law is
concerned with external behavior and not with the inner life of men. It rests in large
measure upon compulsion." See comment by the writer in Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life: I and II," 44 M1cH. L. REv. 59
at 103, and 243 at 291 (1945).
Some of Justice Frankfurter's earlier utterances reveal a similar resistance to the
recognition of non-external factors. It is quite common in psychodynamic experience
in so-called "normal" behavior to project outwardly, which implies also overlooking
one's own tendencies and qualifications. In Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 at
477, 66 S.Ct. 1318 (1946), he spoke of "the layman's ventures into psychiatry'' which
had beclouded the case. Yet, his own. references to psychological factors in Pennekamp
v. Florida, though very much to the point, were those of a "layman." Until judges
are educated to understand thoroughly the working materials with which they are
occupied in discharging their duties, considerable incompetency of both bench and bar
is to be expected •. But under such compromise conditions any effort by "laymen" to
implement the vas?ly neglected field ,of psychodynamics should be encouraged. Even
crude results by the use of such knowledge by bench and bar is better than reliance upon
obsolete procedures. The resort to expert and trained opinion in this field is surely
not very far off.
Earlier utterances of Justice Frankfurter appear in United States v. Morgan, 313
U.S. 409 at 422, 61 S.Ct. 999 (1940) and in Thiel v. Southern Pacific, 328 U.S.
217, 66 S.Ct. 984 (1946). In this latter case he quoted Chief Justice Hughes' statement in United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 at 145, 57 S.Ct. 177 (1936): "Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind."
Some years earlier Justice Frankfurter approved of Holmes' attention to what
Frankfurter paraphrased as "the psychologic forces that were rationalized into legal
doctrines••••" Wigmore, "Mr. Justice Holmes," MR. JusTICE HOLMES, edited by
Felix Frankfurter, 233, note 53 (1931).
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damus as a discretionary writ and then to degrees of murder in criminal
cases and from thence to a discussion, on the basis of scientific findings,
of the individual sentencing tendencies of judges. What Justice Reed
has done here is to repeat the error, which is so common, of assuming
that the search for equal laws wherever possible precludes forever the
turther developments of the law in the direction of understanding how
the external standards may by their application and other uses actually
accomplish a miscarriage of justice even according to present meanings
of.the term. This development is possible only by studying the psychodynamic origins of all legal procedures and their manifold uses and
misuses by the individuals for whom they are designed and by whom
they are to be administered.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's reply is one of his most courageous in
substance -and expression. We have already quoted a portion of the
concurring opinion. "No judge fit to be one," he went on to say, "is
likely to be influenced consciousty except by what he sees ,and hears
in court and by what is judicially appropriate for his deliberations."
He proceeded then with one of the most vigorous pleas for the consideration of the effect of unconscious forces on the judicial process we
have read anywhere in a judicial opinion:
" ... However, judges are also human, and we know better
than did our forbears how powerful is the pull of the unconscious
and how treacherous the rational process. While the ramparts of
reason have been found to be more fragile than the Age of Enlightenment had supposed, the means of arousing passion and
confusing judgment have been reinforced. And since judges,
however stalwart, are human, the delicate task of administering
justice ought not to be made unduly difficult by irresponsible
print."
He found support in an English decision:
"' ... It can only be that the judge who, after hearing the
statements, has to pronounce sentence, may, quite unconsciously,
have his judgment influenced by matters which he has no right
to consider . . : Not all defamatory matter can amount to contempt oh:ourt.... ' Oliver, J., in Rex v. Davies, supra, at 445,
446 . . . . To deny that bludgeoning or poisonous comment has
power to influence, or at least to disturb, the task of judging is
to play make-believe and to assume that men in gowns are angels.
The psychological aspects of this problem become particularly
pertinent in the case of elected judges with short tenure." ·
"The administration of law, particularly that of the criminal
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law, normally operates in an environment that is not universal
or even general but individual. The distinctive circumstances of
a particular case determine whether law is fairly administered in
that case, through a disinterested judgment on the basis of what
has been formally presented inside the courtroom on explicit considerations, instead of being subjected to extraneous factors psychologically calculated to disturb the exercise of an impartial judgment." 167
What is most unfortunate, however, is that Justice Frankfurter,
as he had done on another occasion, found it sufficient to refer to a
legal precedent to prove the psychodynamic fact that unconscious factors may influence a judge's performance of tasks without the reference
to any other literature on the subject.

F. New Sources of Law
Mr. Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion in Fisher v. United States,
following shortly after Pennekamp v. Florida, is, however, the first
open and avowed stand taken in the Supreme Court for the recognition of the "increasing knowledge of psychology and psychiatry." As
a Recorder's Court judge in Detroit, Michigan, sitting on the criminal
docket, he had been one of the pioneers in America in the application
of the science of psychiatry to problems of penology and criminality.
There can be no mistaking that the opinion is of the trail-blazing
variety, worthy of recognition with the worthiest written and will go
down in our history of jurisprudence as beginning a more dynamic
167

Penenkamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 at 357, 359, 366, 66 S.Ct. 1029
(Italics the writer's.)
In his essay in MR. JusTICE HOLMES 231, note 33 (1<>31), edited by Felix
Frankfurter, he observed that "the familiar and unconscious play an enormous role in
the exercise of the judicial process" and again quoted an English judge as a precedent,
the "powerful and conservative" Lord Scrutton. "This psychological factor," added
Justice Frankfurter, "is, of course, of infinitely greater significance where a court
possesses the powers of our Supreme Court."
The criticism of the assumption "that men in gowns are angels" recalls the
remark attributed both to Wirt and Pinkney concerning Chief Justice Roger Brook
Taney who was outstanding for his deep-seated judicial prejudices and for his seeming
ability to conceal them-that he, Wirt or Pinkney, "feared that angelic manner of his,
more than all his other attributes." STEINER, TANEY 523 (1922).
Pinkney is credited with having once said of Taney: "I can answer his arguments, I am not afraid of his logic, but that infernal apostolic manner of his, there
is no replying to." Id. 87.
This ambivalence between appearance and unconscious and conscious motivations
is one of the common incidents of life in a culture which puts a premium upon the
appearances far out of proportion to any social value these may have.
( I 946).
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approach for judicial thinkers. The majority of the Court had refused
to give effect to evidence of the accused's psychopathic aggressive
tendencies and low emotional response and borderline mental deficiency
in determining whether there was such deliberation and premeditation
as was essential to first degree murder. The obsolete sanity test of
"right and wrong'' was again applied and, though the Supreme Court
has supervisory jurisdiction over the lower courts, it applied the doctrine of restraint to what is its usual and ordinary and constitutional
function and passed the matter on to the legislature or "at least for
the discretion of the courts of the District." Mr. Justice Frankfurter
did not discuss the direct question chosen for emphasis by counsel for
petitioner. "This case has been much beclouded by laymen's ventures
into psychiatry," 168 he declared; and he predicated his dissent upon
the procedural ground that the ch,arge to the jury was so tenuous on
the subject of premeditation "that the jury ought not to have been
left to founder and :flounder within the dark emptiness of legal jargo~;" and that the instructions consisted of "thread bare generalities,
a jumble of empty abstractions equally suitable for any other charge
of murder with none of the elements that are distinctive about this
case, mingled with talk about mental disease." 169 Mr. Justice Murphy,
however, was direct:
"Here we have more than an exercise in statutory construction
or in local law. It is a capital case involving not a que,stion of
innocence or guilt but rather a consideration of the proper standards to be used in judging the degree of guilt. What the Court
says and decides here today will affect the life of the petitioner
as well as the lives of countless future criminals in the District and
in the various states. However guarded may be the Court's statements, its treatment of petitioner's claims will have inevitable
repercussions in state and federal criminal proceedings. Moreover, these claims, whatever their merit, afford a rare opportunity
to explore some of the frontiers of criminal law, frontiers that
are slowly but undeniably expanding under the impact of our
increasing knowledge of psychology and, psychiatry. These factors are more than sufficient to warrant a full and careful .con- .
sideration of the problems raised by this case.'!
"If, as a result, new rules of evidence or new modes of treatment for the partly defective must be devised, our system of
168
169

Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 at 477, 66 S.Ct. .1318 (1946).
Id. at 487.
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criminal jurisprudence will be that much further enlightened.
Such progress clearly outweighs any temporary dislocation of
settled modes of procedure. Only by integrating scientific advancements with our ideals of justice can law remain a part of
the living fiber of our civilization." 110
The frontiers of criminal law are the frontiers of jurisprudence.
The line of demarcation drawn between civil law and criminal law is
an artificial one and has changed through the ages. Prohibition is still
the dominant psychodynamic mechanism for the ordering of society
and its evidences are in the varying degrees of action taken to avoid
restraint and in the highly prized superstitions which leave the individual to be the victim of the ignorance of his parents and of society.
The view set forth by the dissent of Mr. Justice Murphy and joined
in by Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge marks an advanced conception of the nature of the judicial function, a conscious effort again to
seek and apply new evidence concerning human motivations as contrasted with the idea that the Court is to be mainly an avoiding and
excluding body.
!
170

Id. at 491, 493-494, reversing Fisher v. United States, (App. D.C. 1945)
149 F. (2d) 28. Expert evidence was introduced to show defendant was a psychopathic personality. Instruction was asked that the entire personality be considered,
"his mental, nervous, emotional and physical characteristics, as developed by the
evidence of the case" on the question of premeditation. This was refused. Arnold,
J. said: "modern psychiatry has given us much scientific information which disturbs the former certainty of our judgments of individual responsibility and moral
guilt. It has revolutionized the methods of treatment and rehabilitation of prisoners.
But the principal place for the application of such a therapeutic point of view
where the court exercised discretion in the amount of the sentence and in the
treatment of criminals is in our penal institutions. In the determination of guilt age
old conceptions of individual moral responsibility cannot be abandoned without creating a laxity of enforcement that undermines the whole administration of criminal law."
Id. at 29.
.
See ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GovERNMENT 269-270 (1935) where a prejudicial attitude on the future of psychiatry and government is expressed. However,
we do not agree with the idea that psychiatry has introduced the idea of an abstract
man with a subconscious mind. It is conceivable in our opinion that as knowledge
advances the idea of an unconscious mind will disappear but not the study of human
motivation.
See comment on Justice Murphy's dissent in the Fisher case in Chairman Walsh's
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CoMMITTEE ON RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL, Advance
Program of the Sixty-ninth Annual Am. B. Assn. Meeting 92 (1946).
The Supreme Court many years ago pronounced a patent for an invention as a
mental result and the invention as "the product of the inventor's brain.' 1 Marsh v.
Nichols, Shepard & Co., 128 U.S. 605 at 612, 9 S.Ct. 168 (1888); also Smith v.
Nichols, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 112 at 118 (1874). Such far-reaching statements of
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There is much of such new evidence already available the use of
which ,has been blocked and obscured by a preoccupation with endeavor to make a science out of compulsion and prohibition. At the
most today law is a "science" of the effect of similar prohibitions in
allegedly similar situations. The whole psychodynamic field of relationships has been left tb others to study and for the courts to deal
with on a hunch basis. Almost half a century ago the physicists began
to discover the mistake to which their absolutisms had led them; only
then did physics begin to make' strides. Yet, to the untrained eye the
material world does not even present a problem in relatioµships. How
much more so ought this to be the case in dealing with human society
which from the very earliest primitive days has been constantly at
work trying to improve relationships.
It does seem that at some time in man's history the capacity to
judge was forcibly restricted to those who could make their own judgments effective. Such a theory of law has no real foundation except
the history of its own experience which is replete with huge _failures
which are only beginning to be understood as such. Until the human
capacity to judge is more wide-spread and until those who judge cease
merely to repeat the mistakes of the past we are not even ready to
think of a final theory of law notwithstanding the seeming effort to
undermine competing fallacious doctrine. Much study of psychodynamic processes must precede any summations. And, if we are to
follow any "rule," a good rule to follow is that where the prohibition
is greatest so also is the inadequacy greatest. Nor do we .suggest that
such prohibitions be forthwith relaxed, for this would bring with it
anarchy and complete social chaos. But rather that we realize the
why of such processes and begin to think in terms of helping man to
judge for himself on matters heretofore accepted as closed.
The awareness of unconscious procedures cannot be achieved overnight. Nevertheless, some things may be noticed immediately. We
may now observe that the prohibitions of legal systems are directed
mainly at maintaining that sharp split between conscious and unconscious motivation which is at the root of nearly all mental illness
as well as many somatic disturbances. This indicates an intimate reciprocal relationship between medicine and law. Both our intellect and our
affective functions are devoted to the task of adjustment to an atmospsychodynamic import have never been applied by the Court to the problems of juris-prudence except in the most unscientific and casual manner.
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phere of choice between no-behavior and yes-behavior. Hence, follows a routinization of the intellect 'for the express purpose of being
able better to observe similarities in the narrow field of command
and its precedents. So much is this true that the law has proven ineffective to cope with so difficult a task. It had to receive much aid
from the individual himself in the development of automatic responses
to forbidden situations. One had to develop a "conscience" or perish
for violations of the taboo. And, where the conscience did not entirely
take care of the control, paralysis and other diseases might incapacitate
one for breaching law and custom. Rationalization and superstition
are also aids to the same end but they are psychodynamically mqre
"efficient" since they succeed in absorbing some affect in the process;
but actually it is only a pseudo-efficiency. A large portion of the affect
which is pent up by misdirected prohibitions finds outlets in warspolitical, religious and humanitarian. These outlets were legalized
into trial by combat between individuals and_ then trial of ideologies
by war. In a word, there is much to be learned about the sources· of
law. We have suggested only a few avenues into which mqumes
may lead.

III
PsYCHODYNAMIC IMPORTANCE OF J oHNsoN's Vrnw OF DICTA AND
INACCURATE REPORTING
It has been our method to discuss the psychodynamic aspects of
various incidents in the life of Johnson as we proceed so as to avoid
that compartmentalization which usually characterizes studies of early
history and its actors. This method enables us better to place facts in
their total context, thereby avoiding much of the color which distance
gives to men and events. At this point we see, for example, that
Johnson's aversion to dictum and to misapplied principle, his bold
opposition to the phantoms of the abstract and his refusal to be guided
by any notions of infallibility are not isolated political positions taken
by a member of a certain party who happened to be appointed to the
Supreme Court. Rather do we find the most striking cons_istency in
one thing-and that is the consistency with which psychodynamic pressure was exerted toward the release of knowledge from the prisons
of the past. He saw that from time immemorial tradition, history and
superstition had been successful to the detriment of mankind in blocking any efforts to expand the powers of the human mind. This influence
had been so powerful that not only were those who administered
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society averse to such expansion but also those who would benefit by
the change were similarly imbued.
Can it be that anthropologists-even before the advent of modern
psychiatry-had revealed jurisprudence as a surface science and, there-.
fore, not able or willing to penetrate beneath the most obvious layers?
The answer must be "yes." From' the vantage point employed by
Edward B. Tylor we discover the primitive method as the prevalent
one even among moderns. In distinguishing the savage from the
modern Tylor asserts that the savage
" . . . by· no means goes through life with the intention of
gathering more knowledg~ and framing better laws than his
fathers. On the contrary, his tendency is to consider his ancestors
· as having handed down to him the perfection of wisdom, which it
would be impiety to make the least alteration in. But we civilized
moderns have just that wider knowledge which the rude ancients
wanted. Acquainted with events and their consequences far and
wide over the world we are able to direct our course with more
confidence toward improvement. •In a word mankind is passing
from the age of unconscious to that of conscious progress." 111
This was written in I 88I. Since that time the ability of man to
direct his course has been ·materially enhanced-but the actual use of
such self-knowledge now awaits the will of a politically-minded universe which is very much confused by the distortions which "wider
knowledge" could help to dissipate.
No better use of principles is possible without an adequate basis of
self-knowledge and the training in the ability to detect the numerous
and devious ways in which the psychodynamic tools or instruments
which man has adopted and developed have distorted and confused
him. In primitive man the mind has left all members of society the
prey to the archaic superstitions of their predecessors, living in the
self-degrading traditions of their ignorant elders. No patronizing interest in primitive life, which transmutes the dull and routinized ritual
by which they are mentally enslaved, into alluring and modernized
"folklore" can remove the essential hypocrisy in such adoration of
superstition. And in the case of modern man; who is supposed to know
better but is beginning too slowly to face his errors, the tragedy of
capacity thrown to the winds is continually reenacted. Therefore,
modern man is but little above the level of the primitive in his reliance
on superstition and his rejection of the facts about himself. Since the
a
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see infra, pp. 519, 520.

439 (1881). For additional thoughts expressed by Tylor
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law is the most prevailing of all institutions it is likewise rendered
impotent to go beyond the simple prohibitory conceptions of nomadic
tribes.
It is no longer possible to think of the law as an isolated culture
technique. The conventional method of studying the life of a jurist
is to ask: What specific reforms in the law did he advocate or with what
large political movements did he identify? Our method, however, is
to examine all utterances and acts in the attempt to arrive at some
psychodynamic synthesis which will in some measure explain the individual's strivings of a lifetime and to glean from such effort whatever we may find concerning the dynamic sources of law as it affects
the individual and society. Accordingly, when we point out Johnson's
careful examination of the decisions of the past it is not because we
are anxious to launch an academic attack on obiter dicta. Rather is it
that we see in this manifestation a dynamic trend of personality in
relation to law and social pressures which take the form of prohibitions.
It is the continued and unrelenting integrity which must be noticed
even though it is repeated time and again.
.
With this background we may better understand why Johnson
was so critical of the reporters. It was just another living through of
his struggle for self-knowledge. His complaints must not be considered merely as carping criticisms of unrealistic disaffection. Generalizations of character which are made to appear as disinterested
analyses often contain more than a negligible quantity of prejudiced
and hostile projection of one's own inner self. But it is not easy to
examine persons and their accomplishments with complete detachment.
Nevertheless, because the integrity of our perspective requires it we
should try to examine these clashes with reporters with a minimum of
affective bias.
·
We must also remember that reporting of court decisions in earlier
days was careless and biased-but no more so than court decisions
themselves. ''It is to be regretted," Johnson wrote in one of his later .
opinions, "that the case referred to had not been more fully reported.
As it is not preceded by any statement of facts, abstracts of the history
and laws of this society, or the arguments of counsel, the insulated unexplained opinion of the court, as it is printed, must be ever unintelligible to all descriptions of readers, except those whose professional
duties lead them to the study of the novel and extensive institution
whose interests are involved in it." 112
·
The need for the exercise of caution had been dwelt upon J:>y others ·
172

Mutual Assurance Soc. v. Faxon, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 606 at 606, 607 (1821).
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also; Ephraim Kirby, himself a Connecticut reporter ,at the time of thd
Revolution, deplored ·the lack of proper· histories of adjudicatiori's sci
that "the principles of the decisions were soon forgot or misunderl
stood, or erroneously reported from memory. Hence, arose confusion
in the determination of our courts, the rules of property became un..:
certain, and litigation proportionately inc!'eased." 173

A. Criticism of Unjustified Stretching of Principles by Reporters
Civilization-or culture, as some call it-has advanced step by
step because of man's peculiar and ambivalent use of that quality of
intellect which enabled him to note similarities of experience and to
generalize about them and then, forthwith, to challenge their authenticity or dominating authority. The historical correctness of the omnipresence of this psychodynamic phenomenon is not a matter for dispute. It shows itself in every phase of human activity and in every
social grouping no matter how far geographically removed or no matter how far apart in the cultural scale of development. It is apparent
in all religious dogma, in the dogmas of ,chemistry and physics, in the
dogmas concerning men:tal behavior and in the emotional attachment
to precedent as something apart. In the main the mind has heretofore
functioned very. poorly. Gathering fact alone could not be a basis
for a claim for "superiority." The physical scientists have been especially remiss in attaching an intangible and mystic value to their· ability
to note similarities. But they have failed miserably in synthesizing
their knowledge and relating it to life as a whole. Often unconsciously
and often consciously these scientists have used fact gathering and the
capacity to generalize from research as a fulcrum for personal aggression. Therefore, the detached scientific purpose of generality 174 has
173
Quoted by WILLIAM GARRAT BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH
(1905).
.
174
The most eminent jurists and students of jurisprudence have not succeeded in
maintaining a scientific point of view. Professor Williston of the Harvard Law School,
the eminent and beloved scholar, thinker and writer in the field of contract law, tells
in his reminiscences of his troubles with the famous Dean Langdell, his superior,
"Langdell," he recalls, "was not much interested in the historical development of
the law except as it led to the discovery of legal principles. When the principles
were discovered he would trace their consequences with relentless logic as that employed by the sternest Calvinist. Decisions inconsistent with them, he said were
wrong. He has been called in consequence a legal theologian." WILLISTON, LIFE AND
LAW 99 (1940).
In an earlier article we said concerning the misuse of principles: "No human
can doubt the value of principles as means of acomplishing greater understanding. This
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hid little hold on· man as is the· -case with more pr1m1t1ve minds.
Primitive man quickly learned how to ·make use of logical methods
even though his dynamism was principally aHective. Principles became
weapons or personal defenses and the primitive leaders soon learned
that most men could easily be deceived into believing that their real
security lay in the ritualistic worship and practice of generality. Civilized man has not improved very much over this earlier process.
Hence, the doctrine or principle that is stretched too far is akin to
the magical methods of primitive man. It is· a searching for emotional
security by exhausting the e:ffects of what has already transpired in
the past. Viewed psychodynamically, the adherence to precedent is
an ex post facto use made of an earlier means of solving a problem.
In this complex world such secondary uses are required very much
in the same way as an inventor resorts to the prior art. But the insistence on precedent-adherence in its primitive forms means an end to
personal liberty in its broadest connotations. It implies the degradation of the capacity of present man and his inability to judge for himself. Only when we look down the course of the history of man's
struggle with his mind may we fully appreciate what Johnson was
trying to do. His aversion to routine ex post facto thinking was intense.
With characteristic and consistent caution-based on experience-he
first tried to understand the principle, the prior art, so-to-speak; and
then he returned to the earlier habitat of the principle to find out
what it did in truth solve or attempt to solve. For example, in Smith
v. Union Bank he answered an argument in conflict of laws: "But if
we look into books, we do not find it there. . . . If we look into facts,
we find no evidence there, to sustain such an exception...." 175 So in
an equity case he admitted the principle that equity will not lend its
aid to an unconscionable bargain but he challenged counsel who tried
to apply the principle because "the argument carries this principle
is true in economics, mathematics, language, law or any branch of science. The high
road of principles has been, however, the mechanism of the epigram, the aphorism or
the simple truism which temporarily solves a situation of conflict by excluding all
other knowledge and 'fences in' the emotions. The most prevalent sign of pessimism
throughout the world, without exception, is the resistance to the study of those psychodynamic facts which may be called the common incidents of the mind. Any effort,
with a few exceptions, even to inject into discussion this most common of all elements,
invites the same emotional attack that was once discharged toward a heretic or dissenter
in the days of the Inquisition." Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and The
Common Incidents of Life: II," 44- MxcH. L. REv. 243 at 290 (1945).
175
5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 518 at 526 (1831).

506

MICHIGAN LAw REvrnw

rather too far as applied to this case." 1·76 He studiously avoided the
argument which "proves too much." 111
He was not the ·first nor the last of the judges 178 to strike out
against obiter dictum or the stretching of principles. But it should be
noticed that with Johnson dictum was·frowned on for more than merely
legal reasons. He consistently followed a practice of disavowing it.
His remarks in Hodgson v. United States are typical not so much
because of the refusal to indulge in excessive adjudication as by reason
of the suggestion that the legislature might well take over that responsibility:
"From these considerations, it seems to result, that the court
is driven to the necessity of deciding this case, upon its intrinsic
merits, and reserving its opinion upon successive cases as they
shall occur. This necessity is forced 1 upon us by the alternative
either to decide that no misrepresentation, however gross, of the
size of the vessel, will avoid a policy, or that any misrepresentation, however minute, will have that effect. It is to be hoped,
in the meantime, that some statutory provision may be made
which will relieve the court from a similar embarrassment." 179
176

DeWolf'v. Johnson, IO Wheat. (23 U.S.) 367 at 392 (1825). In Johnson's
remarks on the publication of Attorney General Rodneys letter to President Jefferson
in regard to Johnson's decision in Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, (C.C. S.C.
1808) IO Fed. Cas. No. 5,420, p. 355 at 360, he said that the Attorney General
had "drawn reasons from inconvenience, which may prove a great deal too much for
the public security."
177
Mr. Justice Cardozo in Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 at 252,
61 S.Ct. 48 (1941), also Duplex Printing Press v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 at 448,
41 S.Ct. 172 (1921).
178
In the recent case of Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury. Park, 316 U.S.
502 at 513, 62 S.Ct. u29 (1942), Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in his opinion: "From
time to time, ever since Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 199, it has been stated
that a state insolvency act is limited by the Contract Clause of the Constitution in
authorizing composition of preexisting debts. So it is, but it all depends on what
is affected by such a composition and what state power it brings into play. The dictum
from Sturges v. Crowninshield is one of those inaccurate generalizations that has
gained momentum from uncritical repetition."
1711
Hodgson v. Marine Insurance Co., 5 Cranch (9 U.S.) 100 at II4 (1809).
See also United States v. Attorney General of Louisiana, 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 57 at
67 (1830), where Johnson said: "We would not be understood to intimate that the
United States are entitled to this money; for they had no power to sell; nor do we
feel ourselves bound to remove the difficulties which grow out of this state of things."
See also Yeaton v. Bank, 5 Cranch (9 U.S.) 49 at 54 (1909), where he said: "I
have no doubt of the power of Congress to deprive them also of their summary remedy;
but it has not yet legislated to that effect." See also Levin, "Mr. Justice William
Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 803 at 812 et seq.

( 1944).

JUSTICE JOHNSON

B. Psychodynamic Basis of Intellectual Display
Johnson was seldom-if ever--carried away by scholarship and
erudition or a resort to classical authority. Here again he was in the
vanguard of understanding. Today we have enough data about human
behavior available to enable us oftentimes to detect in the display of
learning the ambush of concealed aggression actuaJ.ly employed for
purposes of personal and partisan manipulation of the universe.
Obscurant dictum has frequently found its seeming support in citation
of text and case.
A passage in Croudson v. Leonard,180 an early opinion, sheds light
on Johnson's mental approach to legal problems. The occasion was the
presence of a jurisdictional question. "I do not think it is necessary,"
he said, "to go through the mass of learning on this subject, which
has so often been brought to the notice of this court, and particularly
in the case of Fitzsimmons, argued at this term. Nearly the whole of
it will be foµnd very well summed up in the r 8th chapter of Mr.
Park's Treatise." 181 Johnson was essentially an original thinker moved
by the creative impulse which animates an inventor. His opinions seldom contain what is readily found in the texts but they are full of the
observations of the operation of an active and discriminating mind
looking mainly at the multiform varieties of human experience-the
common incidents of life.
Even when he relied upon precedent Johnson did not rush too
quickly to cite authority and was seldom disturbed by the absence
of cases. "It may be true that there are no cases upon this subject prior
to that of Hughes v. Cornelious, but this does not disprove the existence
of the doctrine. There can be little necessity for reporting decisions
upon questions that cannot be controverted. Since the case of Hughes
v. Cornelious, the doctrine has frequently been brought to the notice
of the courts of Great Britain in insurance cases, but always with a view
to contest its applicability to particular cases, or to restrict the general
doctrine by exceptions, but the existence of the rule· or its applicability
to actions on policies is nowhere controverted." 182 Whether he was
concerned with a novel principle or the application of a well-known
principle to a new state of facts, he was not at a loss to find precedents
if he needed them. He could find that the common law had sufficient
precedent for the rule "in its received principles." 188
180

4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 434 (1808).
Id. at 435.
152 Id. at 436.
188
Ibid. In Jackson·v. Huntington, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 402 at 436 (1831), he said
181
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Many years later, when lie had occasion to consider the decisions
of the State of Virginia which he said the court was "in the habit of
regarding with the highest respect . . . upon causes arising under
their own statutes," he found it unnecessary to corroborate them by
citation of authority. "But any one," he added, "desirous of pursuing
the inquiry, will find the law on this subject very well collected and
digested in Mr. Starkie's 3d vol. of his Treatise on Evidence, and page
18
1225 of Mr. Metcalf's edition."
In Miller v. Stewart,185 Johnson
filed a strong dissenting opinion in an action involving the law of
erasures in instruments where the name of another county had been
inserted in a bond by _interlining. His discussion of the authorities and
his criticism of the reporter discloses some dynamic juristic attitudes
and again the dislike of unnecessary display of refined legalistic effort:
,j,

"There is a great paucity of decisions, in modern times, on the
subject of razures and interlineations. If we mount to its origin,
in regard to a rule of property: "His freehold was then held to be out of him, to
be converted into a right of entry or right of action, and as such, no more the subject
of a legal transfer at common law, than an ordinary chose in action. It being so
settled in New York, it is in vain to enquire further; but, en passant, it may be observed, that there are few principles of more ancient or more dignified origin. It is
the law of kings, that the fact of possession proves the right of possession; and the
idea is thrown out by Blackstone, that it probably passed down from greater to less,
, until it extended to every man's close." Routine acceptance of a settled rule was not
enough as in Lidderdale's Executors v. Robinson, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 594 at 598
( 1827) : "That this, then, is the settled law of the state in which this contract and this
cause originated, cannot be doubted. But we feel no inclination to place our decision
upon that restricted ground, since we are well satisfied with its correctness on a general
principle, and on authorities of great respectability in other states." In his separate
opinion in Inglis v. Trustees of The Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 99 at
140 (1830), Johnson found authorities where none were said to exist: "It has been
said that there are neither adjudged cases nor dicta of elementary writers on the subject of the law as it stood previous to the 43 Eliz.; but this, I think, is not quite
correct. In Swinburn on Wills, as well as Godolphin's Orphan's Legacy, both books
of great antiquity and high authority, we find all the rules for construing, enforcing
and effectuating charities which have been maintained and acted upon in the chancery,
since the 43 Eliz., laid down as the existing laws of charitable devises . . . •"
In the Bank of The United.States v. Weisiger, 2 Pet. 331 at 350 (1829), Johnson
remarked that the court was "inclined to think, that it has been rather too hastily
conceded, that no case similar to the present has ben adjudicated." In Caldwell v.
Taggart, 4 Pet. (29 U.S.) 190 at 202 (1830), in discussing certain aspects of
judicial process said that "there is no want of learning in the books, on this subject.
The general rule is laid down thus..•." And in Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet.
(26 U.S.) 46 at 81 (1828), he remarked that while a court in adjudicating upon questions of practice should have regard to public convenience "it would be extending this
principle to the violation of its own spirit and intent, if carried to the extent of
overturning known established rules, both of law and practice."
184
Mason v. Matilda, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 590 at 594 (1827)_
185
9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 680 (1_824).
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we find it, in the year-books, and in Perkins, who cites them,
given, as the ground of suspicion and inquiry. And so, unquestionably, it ought to be, and frauds or mutilations, to which the
parties having the custody of deeds are privy, cannot be taken too
strongly against them. But when we encounter the doctrine, as
laid down in Pigot's Case, 'that when a deed is altered in a point
material, by a stranger, without the privity of the obligee, even
by drawing a pen through the midst of a material word, that it
shall be void,' without reference to the fraud, ·privity, or gross
negligence of the obligor, it certainly is time to pause; and I
highly approve of the hesitation of my brother Story, in Cutt's
Case, as to the authority of Pigot's Case. As an adjudication, the
value of that case should be limited to the single point, 'that ari
immaterial interlineation, without the privity or command of the
obligee, does not avoid the bond.' The case does not call for the
decision of another point, for it is upon a special verdict, and that
the only question submitted. Yet, the reporter, who seldom lets
an opportunity escape him, that furnishes an apology for exemplifying his indefatigable research, makes it authority for a score
of positive decisions, and the introduction to a mass of law, upon
questions totally distinct. But it should be noted of this learned
judge, that his reports, like the text of Littleton, are only to be
considered as the occasion or excuse for displaying his acquirements in the law learning of his day, and expressing his opinions
upon juridical topics." 186
His language does not spare the reporter. But in the light of what
we have already said about his exercise of the judicial function we may
discover in the criticism a correct psychodynamic reflection of judicial
method.
C. Other Instances of Dereliction by Reporters
In Finlay v. King's Lessee, we have a comparable instance: "There
was a case cited in argument to sustain the judgment below, on which
so much reliance was placed, that I shall not pass it over unnoticed. It
is the case of Thomas v. H owel, reported in Salkeld and Modern ( r
Salk, r70; 4 Mod. 66), and very defectively reported in both. The
report in Salkeld does not give the half of the case; and that in 4 Mod.
gives a very unsatisfactory account of the reasons which governed the
court." 187 And in Inglis v. The Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor,188 he declared what he considered the only point decided in a
Id. at 717.
3 Pet. {28 U.S.) 346 at 394 {1830).
188
3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 99 at 137 {1830).
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cause referred. to "notwithstanding the marginal notes of the reporter
to the contrary."
,
In the famous case of Ogden v. Saunders 189 Johnson approached
the abstract question of the general power of the states to pass laws
for the relief of insolvent debtors by carefully examining two earlier
decisions. Here again he looked with more than ordinary scrutiny at
the report of the cases for any attempts to overextend the precedent
of these cases by generalization:
"And this brings under review the two cases· of Sturges v.
Crowninshield, and McMillan v. McNeill, adjudged in the year
1819, and contained in the 4th vol. of the reports. If the marginal note to the report, or summary of the effect of the case of
McMillan v. McNeill, presented a correct view of the report of
that decision, it is obvious, that there would remain very little, if
anything for this court to decide. But by comparing the note of
the reporter with the facts of the case, it will be found, that there
is a generality of expression° admitted into the former, which the
case itself does not justify. The principle recognized and affirmed
in McMillan v. McNeill, is one of universal law, and so obvious
and incontestable that it need be only understood to be assented
to."190
After finishing with the McMillan case he went on to discuss the
case of Sturges v. Crowninshield, remarking that the report of that
case "needs also some explanation. The court was, in that case, greatly
divided in their views of the doctrine, and the judgment partakes as
much of a compromise, as of a legal adjudication."
In M~nor v. Mechanics' Bank 191 Johnson dissented vigorously from
the holding of the majority. His opinion reveals a careful analysis of
early cases and authorities, abounding in references to Coke, Sergeant
Williams, Sergeant Salkeld, Saunders Croke's Eliz., Maule and
Selwyn, Bur. Reports, Rolls Abridgement, Hobart, Kebble and Silley's
Practical Register, Wood and others. The question was whether a
nolle prosequi could be entered as to one defendant after verdict and
judgment for the principal on a bond, leaving four out of five joint
and several obligors on the bond liable on the judgment. Mr. Justice
Story had asserted in his'opinion that "there is no decision exactly in
point, to the present case." _But we know Johnson well enough by
l81l 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 {1827). See note 178, supra, for Mr. Justice
· Frankfurter's comment on Sturges v. Crowinshield.
1
1JO Id. at 272.
191 1 Pet. {26 U.S.) 46 (1828).
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this time not to be startled by the vigor of his attack on the statements
of jurists who preceded him. He proceeded to dislodge the assumed
authority of Serjeant Williams by pointing out that the knowledge of
earlier times had been confused by subsequent learning. This deserves
special comment, for, although Johnson was averse to ex post facto
thinking, he was usually alert to show that earlier and more primitive
concepts had later become distored by rationalizations. This is not a
resort to a precedent but rather an unfolding of the layers of deceptive
logic of later times. Johnson wrote:
"But it is said, and so Serjeant Williams asserts, 'that the true
nature and extent of a nolle prosequi, in civil cases, was not accurately defined and ascertained, until modern times.'
"My own opinion is, from all the investigation I have been
able to make, that it was much better understood, in former times,
than it is at this day. That if it were now better understood, we
should perceive fewer of those inconsistencies which are supposed
to exist in the decisions on this subject. Thus, Serjeant Williams
has mixed up the cases on torts, with those on contracts, in such
a manner as could only produce confusion. To sustain the doctrine
that a nolle prosequi, in an action of debt, is a bar to another suit
on the same bond, he quotes Green v. Charnock, Cro. Eliz. 762,
which was trespass quare clausum fregit. And for other cases
which he says establish the principle 'that a nolle prosequi is not
of the nature of a retraxit, or a release; but an agreement only,
not to proceed as to some of the defendants, on a part of the suit,'
without restricting the doctrine to any class of cases,. he cites a
string of authorities, in every one of which the decisions were
in actions of trespass or tort.... It cannot be contested, and the
whole argument is admitted, that if the discharge of the principal
produce a bar in his favor, this judgment should be reversed for
error. But the conclusion that it is no bar, is now to be deduced
from a string of decisions, in every one of which, Serjeant Williams himself admits, that no recovery could be had against the
defendant who has been discharged by the nolle prosequi. It is
true, he attributes this bar to the nature of the action; by this, at
least, acknowledging that the material question, in the trespass
cases, never could arise in the present case." 102
He then proceeded to analyze the "only case, in which the question.in this case came distinctly before the court." However, he did
not fail to offer some praise for the work of a text writer:
192

Id. at 83, 84, 87.
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"There is a modern book of practice of great respectability
(I mean Sellon, t_it. Nolle Prosequi), in which this doctrine is
summed up to my entire satisfaction. The form of the entry is
there given in words, and conforms entirely to the entry in this
case, except that the words are here added, that 'the plaintiffs
take nothing by their bill, but, for their 'false clamors be in
mercy;' which can at least detract-nothing from the effects of the
judgment. Yet it is there laid down, as the law of his day, that
such a judgment, when it goes to the whole cause of action, operates, in effect, as a retraxit." 193
J oli.nson disliked needless enumerations because this "would be
to incur the imputation of vain parade." 194 At times he cited authorities "to show the antiquity and universality'' of doctrine. In the same
paragraph from which this quotation was taken he referred to "some
reporters whose authority has been consecrated by the respect of ages,"
and he remarked that "innumerable ancient cases might be cited from
the best reporters of the application of the rule." 195
We note again 'in passing, upon reading the last few excerpts,· that
there runs through all of Johnson's writings statements which affirm
the existence of certain first principles which govern mankind but
which have been obscured. by mankind's rationalization and by mis-,
directed and misused learning. Johnson's emphasis on these principles
· seems almost inconsistent with his questioning of general principles.
If, however, it is understood that he believed in all of the efforts of
science by experiment and investigation to improve mankind these
first principles in a dynamic sense must have meant the same to him
as the finding of observable basic facts of human behavior. 196
In Shanks v. Dupont,1 7 which came up from the state court of
South Carolina, there was raised a question of the effect on the right
to inherit of the failure of heirs to be born of allegiance to the State
1)

193
194

Id. at 85, 86.
Fullerton v. Bank of the United States, 1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 604 at 615 (1828).

Mr. Justice Frankfurter's comment concerning Justice Story's learning is particularly
appropriate because he sat on the- Bench with Johnson for many years. Speaking of
Story's dissent in the Charles River Bridge case, II Pet. (36 U.S.) 420 (1837), he
says: "Story's- dissent proves that even vast erudition is no substitute for creative
- imagination." Frankfurter, "Mr. Justice Holmes and The Constitution," JusTICE
HOLMES, edited by Felix Frankfurter, 53 (1931).
195
Fullerton v. Bank of United States, id. at 615. His preference for modern
decisions is here indicated.
196
See Lev.in, "Mr. William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life: II," 44
MICH. L. REv. 243 at 269 et seq. (1945) for further discussion.
197
3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 242 (1830).
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of South Carolina. In a spirited dissenting opinion Johnson, with his
usual alert discrimination, found that again he had to question a reporter's accuracy:
"The decision in the case of Palmer v. Downer does, it is
true, admit the right of election; but besides that that case is very
imperfectly, and I may add, unauthentically, reported, it is most
certainly overruled in the subsequent case of Martin v. Woods." m
He was no kinder to Gordon's Digest which indulged in some of the
objectionable reporting practices against which Johnson was mentally
committed:
"Before I quit the case it may be proper to ~otice a passage
in a book recently published in this country, and which has been
purchased and distributed under an act of congress; I mean Gordon's Dig~t. There is no knowing what degree of authority it
may be supposed to acquire by this act of patronage; but if there
is any weight in the argument in favor of expatriation, drawn
from the acts of congress on that subject, I presume the argument
will, at some future time, be applied to the doctrines contained
in this book. If so, it was rather an unhappy measure to patronise
it; since we find in it a multitude of nisi prius decisions, obiter
dicta, and certainly, some striking misapprehensions, ranged on
the same shelf with acts of congress. On the particular subject
now under consideration, art. r 649, we find the following sentence: 'Citizens of the United States have a right to expatriate
themselves in time of war, as well as in time of peace, until restrained by congress;' and for this doctrine the author quotes Talbot v. Jansen, 3 Dall. 133, and the case of The Santissima
Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 348; in both which cases, the author has
obviously mistaken the argument of counsel for the opinion of
the court; for the court in both cases expressly waive expressing
an opinion, as not called for by the case, since, if conceded, the
facts were not insufficient to sustain the defense.
"The author also quotes a case from r Peters' C. C., which
directly negatives the doctrine, and a case from 4 Hall's Law
Journal, 462, which must have been quoted to sustain the opposite doctrine. It is the case of The United States v. Williams,
in which the chief justice of the United States presided, and in
which the right of election is expressly negatived, and the individual who pleaded expatriation is convicted and punished." 199
198
199

Id. at 266.
Id. at 266, 267.
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In his dissent in United States v. Falmer he proclaimed: "I here
enter my protest against having these questions adjourned to this
court. We are constituted to decide causes, and not to discuss themes,
or digest systems." 200 Later, in his dissent in Columbian Insurance Co.
v. Catlett,201 he again struck out against marginal notes and correct
principles "thrown together without order and without object":
"But it is supposed, that the cases of Baillie v. Modigliani,
and of Gaze & Richaud v. Baltimore Insurance Company, have
established a contrary doctrine. It appears to me, that it is by
placing too much confidence in the general language of indexes,
and marginal notes, and misapprehending _the doctrine on which
this case turns, that the mistake arises. We have nothing but a
manuscript report of that case of Baillie v. Modigliani, and obviously one for which the learned judge, by whom the decision
is made is very little indebted to his reporter. We find in it a mass
of correct principles, thrown together, without order, and without
object, and which, I make no doubt, is the skeleton of a very
learned and correct opinion; and one which, had we the whole of
it, would have furnished a full exposition of the doctrine of this
case, as well as of that. But, as a decision, the case of Baillie v.
Modigliani does not touch the present case." 202

D. Johnson's Controversy with Wheaton
Johnson on two separate occasions severely criticized Henry
Wheaton, the Supreme Court reporter. 1 It would avail little to enter
into the legal analysis of these controversies here. More significant
is the fact that Wheaton was charged with incorrect reporting-which
if sustained meant incorrect precedent to add to future confusion. The
first instance was in Johnson's opinion in Conrad v. Atlantic Insurance
Company.
"But I avail myself of this occasion, and I have long wished
for an opportunity to put on record some remarks upon the
report of the case of T helusson v. Smith. I have never acknowledged its authority in my circuit, on the point supposed to be decided by it; to wit, the precedence of the debt of the United States,
as to a previous judgment, in the case of a general assignment;
and I propose now to show, what. I think anyone may see by a
close inspection of the facts, even as stated in the report, to wit,
200

3 Wheat. (16 U.S.) 610 at 641 (1818).
12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 383 (1827).
202
Id. at 402.
201
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that the question there supposed to be decided, really never was
raised by the special verdict. It is true, it was argued, and no
other question, judging from the report, was argued. But when
the court came to inspect the record, it m~st have seen, that the
special verdict did not raise the question as between the parties
to that suit. And, moreover, I find, that the reporter has omitted
one very ·material fact found in the special verdict; which was,
that the United States had no interest in the issue, since their
judgment had been voluntarily paid off by the assignees of
Cramond, the bankrupt. I copy the special verdict entered from
the original roll, which I have inspected at the present term." 208
While in the same opinion he relied upon a "sensible rule laid
down . . . in a book of grave authority" he resolutely proceeded to
question the authority of the specific case which had troubled the
fOurt.204

He again reproved Wheaton in one of his most outspoken and
daring opinions-his concurring opinion of Ramsay v. Allegre. It was
here that he declared himself so strongly against the encroachments
of the Admiralty Courts upon common law jurisprudence:
"I concur with my brethren in sustaining the decree below,
but cannot consent to place my decision upon the ground upon
which they have placed theirs. I think it high time to check this
silent and stealing progress of the admiralty, in acquiring jurisdiction to which it has no pretensions. Unfounded doctrines ought
at once to be met and put down; and dicta, as well as decisions,
that cannot bear examination, ought not to be evaded and permitted to remain on the books, to be commented upon, and acI Pet. (26 U.S.) 386 at 451 (1828).
The following is from the opinion, id. at 453: "It often happens, after the
most protracted discussions, that the court differ from counsel in their views of the
questions actually raised on the record, and on grounds which have not been argued.
In the case of Thelusson v. Smith, I hold it to be incontrovertible, that the question
of priority could not have been adjudicated upon, on the verdict, as set out in the
record••••
"I, at least, would have it understood, that I concurred in the judgment in the
case of T helusson o. Smith on no other ground than the want of privity between the
parties. Nor can I acknowledge it as authority to any other point; since the United
States were satisfied, and the assignees could not be regarded in any view, at law, as
succeeding to the priority of the United States, if the United States had priority; and
since that priority could not come in question, in a case in which the sale of the land
was a mere nullity; as is distinctly affirmed in the present decision, because the assignment divested all the interest in the imolvent, so as to place it beyond the action of
the fteri facias, issuing on the judgment of the United States."
The case of Thelusson v. Smith is reported in 2 Wheat. (15 U.S.) 396 (1817).
208
204
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quiesced in, by courts of justice, or to be read and respected by
those whose opinions are to be formed upon books. It affords
facilities for giving an undue bias to public opinion, and, I will
add, of interpolating doctrines which belong not to the law. There
need be no stronger illustration given than this case affords. Here
is a libel, in personam, on a contract, in the admiralty, filed expressly upon the authority of the case of The General Smith.
I had never read the report of that case, that I recollect, until
the argument in this cause; or, if I had, l' attached so little importance to anything in it besides the point that it decides, as to
have forgotten that such doctrines were to be found in the reports
of our decisions. But, upon being examined, what does it amount
to? A gentleman of the bar, whose knowledge, particularly in
the admiralty, commanded the highest respect in this court, is
reported to have laid down a doctrine in very explicit terms,
which, I will venture to say, has no authority in law; and the
court, carried away probably by the infl:µence of his concessions,
- echoes them in terms which are not only not called for by the
case, but actually, as I conceive, contradicted by the decision which
is rendered." 205
Unde~lying the determination to search out error in the old and
new reports was the awareness that the mind too easily is tempted to
accept a simple, unjustifiable solution, because of the existence of an
"authority." This was very much of a novel approach for a jurist of
those times and may be unmistakably detected in the following language of the opinion:
"I allude to that quotation from r Roll. Abr. 533, which is
copied into Bae. Ahr. p. 196 of the rst vol. and there, together
with the note which refers to Cro. Car. 296, has remained the
permanent source of many an error to those who have not taken
the trouble to examine into the authority for the law laid down." 206
205
12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 6II at 614 (1827). See reference to Allegre case in
Levin, "Mr. Justice William John~on and the Unenviable Dilemma," 42 M1cH. L.
REv. 803 at 820 (1944).
Compare Johnson's words:" • _. . th1s silent and stealing progress of the admiralty''
with Justice Story's language quoted in note 206, infra.
_
206 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 6II at 618 (1827), and note 145 for Johnson's comment on Justice Story's opinion in the case of DeLovio and Boit reported in 2 Gallison, (Oct. 1815). In this opinion at page 398 Story commented on Johnson's opinion
in Ramsay -v. Allegre where Johnson "does not consider the doctrine here laid down as
settled." Story set out in this opinion to regain some of the ground which Admiralty
Courts had lost. It is interesti~g to note that he also charged :'a silent and steady march"
of _extension but in favor of the common law courts: "From a historical view of the cases
in the books, it will abundantly appear, that it has been constantly in danger of losing
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He must have had Mr. Justice Story in mind when he added:
"Some of those loose obiter dicta in which the most eminent
and prudent judges sometimes indulge, have been attributed to
an eminent English jurist, which have been thought to cast some
doubt upon these doctrines in modern times." 201
Judge Winchester's decision in the case of The Sandwich, "learned
as the decision may be," he disposed of by the devastating characterization that "it is obvious, that it is but a tissue of errors." 208 With usual
candor-which should no longer surprise us-Johnson acknowledged
responsibility for his own error in the case of The General Smith:
"In the first place, I stand before the public as bearing my
share of the responsibility incurred for certain opinions expressed
in the case of The General Smith. For the just extent of my responsibility in that case, I must rely on the repeated decisions
which I have made in my circuit in hostility with that doctrine.
But I am willing to treat it as my own error, and shall, on that
ground, claim the privilege of treating it with a greater freedom; at least, I shall endeavor to administer the antidote [sic]
if I have diffused the poison, and claim credit for an unequivocal
proof of my repentance by a public acknowledgment that it was
inexcusable." 209
He then proceeded to analyze the report of the case which had
set forth the argument of Mr. Pinkney, who had argued against the
materialmen, and added:
"Now, I have too high an. opinion of Mr. Pinkney's lawreading, and of his talents as an advocate, not to be well convinced that in this, as well as the residue of the argument attributed to him, he must have been misunderstood. And I -find
my sanction for this belief upon the face of the report itself; for,
with the exception of the nullity of the lien claimed against a
domestic ship, the authority which he quotes to sustain his doctrine, contradicts it in so many words." 210
its most useful jurisdiction. On the other hand, the courts of common law, by silent and
ateady march, have gradually extended the limits of their own authority, until they
have usurped, or acquired concurrent jurisdiction over all causes, except of prize,
within the cognizance of the admiralty." P. 421, 422. The note written in 2 Gallison, quoting Hoffman, called Story's opinion, "in truth, a learned and elaborate
essay on admiralty jurisdiction. • . ." See also· Johnson's opinion in Croudson v.
Leonard, 4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 434 (1808).
201
12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 611 at 624 (1827).
208
Id. at 627.
200 Id. at 635.
210
Id. at 636, 637.
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Again Johnson charged error in the report:
"But this also, when we find the rest of. his reported argument
so clearly a mistake, we have good reason for hesitating to ascribe
to him. And the rather, for that, so well read a lawyer would
not have advanced so bold a doctrine, without attempting to find
some shadow of authority for it. Even Mr. Winder, who argued
against Mr. Pinkney, does not venture to put his case upon the
law of England, but relies upon the law of the continent, and
insists on a right arbitrarily to adopt it here." 211
Wheaton did not permit these criticisms to go unanswered. He
appended to the report of the case pf Ramsay v. Allegre an answer to
Judge Johnson's charges in the form of a footnote from which the
following excerpt is taken:
"The editor of these reports feels it to be a duty which he
owes to self-respect, and to the independence of the bar,. to talFe
some notice of the comments made in the above opinion upon the
account given in the third volume of this work, of Mr. Pinkney's
argument in the case of The General Smith. Whether the editor
was so unfortunate as to misunderstand the argument of that
truly learned person, he is willing should be determined by the
test proposed i_n the above opinion. No other reason is there given
for questioning the accuracy of the report, than that Mr. Pinkney
was too well read a lawyer, and too able an advocate, to have
urged an argument which is contradicted by the authorities he
cites in its support. . ..
"In making these remarks, the editor has certainly not been
influenced by any feelings of disrespect towards the learned judge
by whom the above opinion was delivered, nor even by a desire
to controvert the pecuHar doctrines maintained in that opinion.
It is his own character for accuracy and integrity as the reporter
of the decisions of this court which the editor feels to be assailed,
and therefore, seeks to vindicate. It is a duty which he owes to
the court, to the profession, and to his o~n reputation, to maintain
the fidelity of the reports, which are received as authentic evidence of the proceedings and adjudications of this high tribunal.
If they are not to be relied on in this respect, they are worthless. In closing his labors, the editor has the consolation of reflecting, that it has been. his humble aim to do justice to the
learning and talents of the bar, and to uphold, the honor and
dignity of the bench. How far he has succeeded in this attempt,
it does not become him to speak; but he is willing to submit to
211

Id. at 638.
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the impartial judgment of his professional brethren, whether the
above accusation is supported by evidence." 212

E. Preliminary Analysis of the Dynamics of Johnson's Opposition
At this stage the reader may ask-"What have you shown us here?
An obstinate and disputative jurist who indulged in error but was quick
to find it in others, a disaffected individual who supererogated a higher
knowledge to himself and so forth ... :" The answer must lie in a
complete recapitulation of what we have attempted to show regarding Johnson's cultural evaluations. However, in specific reply it must
be evident by this time that in and out of law he was one of the truly
eminent pioneer thinkers of modern times. It is one of the illusions
of civilized men that perfection is attainable in human relationships
without error and change, whereas in the material sciences trial and
error is the very essence of the highest attainment. What Johnson was
aiming at, psychodynamically viewed, was the overthrow of the authoritarian conception of the common law and its dislodgement as a
superstition. The danger of a despotism of ideas originating in a
feudal past seemed to him as imminent as the tyranny of a monarch
or of parliament. It was a major and unprecedented course for a jurist
to take and has heretofore not been fully appraised. Only in the light
of our modern knowledge of human behavior may we give to his
dynamic questioning of spent authority its well earned place in American history; and only if we attempt to apply some of his methods may
we attain a jurisprudence based upon knowledge of -primary rather
than secondary fact.
We are better able to appraise Johnson's effort when we recall
Tylor's concluding remarks to his epochal work, Primitive Culture,
made about a half century later. After pointing out that "the oftclosed gates of discovery and reform" were then standing open at
their widest, he sounded a pessimistic note of a contrary probability:
"It may be that the increasing power and range of the scientific
method, with its stringency of argument and constant check of
fact, may start the world on a more steady and continuous course
of progress than it has moved on heretofore. But if history is
to repeat itself according to precedent, we must look forward to
stiffer duller ages of traditionalists and commentators, when the
great thinkers of our time will be appealed to as authorities by
men who slavishly accept their tenets, yet cannot or dare not follow their methods through better evidence to higher ends. In
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either case, it is for those among us whose minds are set on the
advancement of civilization, to make the most of present opportunities, that even when in future years progress is arrested,
it may be arrested at higher level." 213
In simplest terms, civilization has developed out of the primitiveas Tylor has shown. But what must also be noticed is that in the
process elements of primitive life which have value for man and his
society have largely been repressed and suppressed. Therefore, in a
real sense the studies in human pehavior mean a return to the understanding of the dynamic factors of primitive behavior of children and
adults and the conversion of the viewpoint of repression and suppression into greater awareness and consciousness. "Better evidence" carries
with it the though that it is evidence which is common to ,all and may
benefit all in their efforts to find worthwhile meaning in life-but it
carries no promise of permanent validity. Nor can the search for evidence justify withholding its findings on the theory that it is dangerous
for the common man to be informed.
The constant struggle between the old and the new found its way
into Johnson's challenge to the claim of authority beyond its proper
scope. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to say that Johnson abhorred
learning. As a scientist he saw learning as' an adjunct of experiment
and, therefore, could not fail to sense the need of keeping close to the
facts. Neither law nor any of its ramifications were to be considered
finalities. To him law was a function-just as science was a functionand not a goal in itself. He could hardly be classed as a utilitarian;
he certainly did not see the law as its own enq. Nor did he yield to
the temptation of making out of the rule of the majority-as did
Holmes-an arbitrary surrogate for the personal despotism of the
sovereign, though he recognized its force.
Johnson's outstanding quality was self-analysis. He saw his own
fallibility and, therefore, could recognize it more readily in others.
At one time he declared that "man without his partialities is but an
unsocial animal; and must be more or less than human, if he loves not
where he has been caressed or dislikes not where he has been injured."- m Yet, in his jurisprudence his objectivity has seldom been
equalled. It was this very partiality which he saw so clearly that required the utmost diligence lest personal prejudice as Holmes warned
us be made into law.
213
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